Client-contractor bargaining on net present value in project scheduling

with limited resources by Kavlak, Nursel et al.
CLIENT-CONTRACTOR BARGAINING ON NET PRESENT VALUE IN PROJECT 
SCHEDULING WITH LIMITED RESOURCES 
 
Nursel Kavlak1, Gündüz Ulusoy1  
Funda Sivrikaya Şerifoğlu2,  Ş. Đlker Birbil1  
 
1Sabancı University, Orhanlı, Tuzla 34956 
Istanbul, Turkey   
(nursel@su.sabanciuniv.edu; gunduz@sabanciuniv.edu; sibirbil@sabanciuniv.edu) 
 
2Düzce University, Konuralp Yerleşkesi 81620, Düzce, Turkey 
(fundaserifoglu@duzce.edu.tr) 
 
ABSTRACT 
The client-contractor bargaining problem addressed here is in the context of a multi-
mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows, which is 
formulated as a progress payments model.  In this model, the contractor receives payments 
from the client at predetermined regular time intervals. The last payment is paid at the first 
predetermined payment point right after project completion. The second payment model 
considered in this paper is the one with payments at activity completions. The project is 
represented on an Activity-on-Node (AON) project network. Activity durations are assumed 
to be deterministic. The project duration is bounded from above by a deadline imposed by the 
client, which constitutes a hard constraint. The bargaining objective is to maximize the 
bargaining objective function comprised of the objectives of both the client and the 
contractor. The bargaining objective function is expected to reflect the two-party nature of the 
problem environment and seeks a compromise between the client and the contractor. The 
bargaining power concept is introduced into the problem by the bargaining power weights 
used in the bargaining objective function. Simulated annealing algorithm and genetic 
algorithm approaches are proposed as solution procedures. The proposed solution methods are 
tested with respect to solution quality and solution times. Sensitivity analyses are conducted 
among different parameters used in the model, namely the profit margin, the discount rate, 
and the bargaining power weights. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, we consider the client-contractor bargaining problem in the context of 
multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling. The bargaining objective is to maximize 
the bargaining objective function comprised of the objectives of both the client and the 
contractor. The objective of the client is to minimize the net present value (NPV) of the 
payments to the contractor, whereas the objective of the contractor is to maximize the net 
return. The individual objectives of the client and the contractor are in conflict most of the 
times. Hence, the bargaining objective should consider the incentives of both parties.  
In the literature, a number of exact and heuristic methods are proposed for solving the 
single objective resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows 
(see, e.g., [14, 18]). Russell [28] introduces an initial version of the discounted cash flow 
problem in project scheduling with no resource constraints. Grinold [12] extends the model by 
Russell by introducing a project deadline. The NPV criterion and its impact on project 
scheduling are investigated by Bey et al. [4]. Baroum and Patterson [1] review the 
development of cash flow weight procedures for the problem. Exact solution procedures for 
the resource constrained version of the problem are given among others by Doersch and 
Patterson [9], Yang et al. [38], Içmeli and Erengüç [15], Baroum and Patterson [2], and 
Vanhoucke et al. [37]. A relatively recent review on project scheduling is provided by 
Kolisch and Padman [22]. 
Exact methods become computationally impractical for problems of a realistic size, 
since the model grows too large quickly and hence, the solution procedures become 
intractable. This leads to studies on a variety of heuristic procedures among others by Russell 
[29], Smith-Daniels and Aquilano [33], Padman and Smith-Daniels [26], Padman et al. [27], 
and Kimms [19]. Etgar et al. [11] present a simulated annealing (SA) solution approach to 
maximize the NPV of a project, where the net cash flow amounts are independent of the time 
of realization. Ulusoy et al. [36] solve the multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling 
problem with discounted cash flows using genetic algorithm (GA). They allow both positive 
and negative cash flows. In their paper they distinguish among four types of payment 
scheduling models: 
 
• Lump-sum payment. The client pays the total payment to the contractor upon 
successful completion of the project. 
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• Payments at event occurrences. Payments are made at a set of event nodes. The 
problem is to determine the amount, location, and timing of these payments.  
• Progress payments. The contractor receives payments at regular time intervals until 
the project is completed. The amount of payment is based on the amount of work 
accomplished since the last payment.  
• Fixed number of payments at equal time intervals. In this payment model, a fixed 
number of payments are made at predetermined equal time intervals over the duration 
of the project, and the final payment is scheduled on project completion. The amounts 
of the payments are either predetermined and fixed or are based on the amount of 
work accomplished since the last payment.  
Mika et al. [25] consider the multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling 
problem with discounted cash flows in the context of the above payment scheduling models 
using positive cash flows only. As solution methods, they employ SA and GA. 
Kazaz and Sepil [17] present a mixed-integer programming formulation of the 
progress payment model with the objective of maximizing the NPV of the cash flows for the 
contractor. Sepil and Ortaç [30] test the performance of some heuristic procedures for 
resource-constrained projects with progress payments. They define cash inflows occurring 
periodically as progress payments, and cash outflows as costs incurred whenever an activity is 
completed. 
Dayanand and Padman [5, 6] attack the problem of simultaneously determining the 
amount, location, and timing of the payments by the client to maximize the contractor’s NPV. 
They deal with this problem further from the perspective of the client [7] and later investigate 
the problem in the context of client and contractor negotiation and stress the need for a joint 
view in their treatise of the payment-at-event-occurrences model [8]. Ulusoy and Cebelli [35] 
include both the client and the contractor in a joint model. They introduce the concept of ideal 
solution, where the ideal solution for the contractor would be to receive the whole payment at 
the start of the project and for the client it would be a single payment at the completion of the 
project. They search for a solution, where the client and the contractor deviate from their 
respective ideal solutions by an equal percentage. They call such a solution an equitable 
solution. A competitive perspective, on the other hand, is provided by Szmerekovsky [34]. He 
considers the case where both the client and the contractor are assumed to act in their own 
best interest rather than trying to compromise. 
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2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
 
The client-contractor bargaining problem addressed here is in the context of a multi-
mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows, which is 
formulated as a progress payments model.  In this model, the contractor receives payments 
from the client at predetermined regular time intervals. The last payment is paid at the first 
predetermined payment point right after project completion. The second payment model 
considered in this paper is the one with payments at activity completions. 
The project is represented on an Activity-on-Node (AON) project network. Activity 
durations are assumed to be deterministic. The project duration is bounded from above by a 
deadline imposed by the client. The deadline constitutes a hard constraint meaning that 
exceeding the deadline violates feasibility. Thus, there is no need to specify a penalty for 
exceeding the deadline. There is no explicitly stated bonus for the contractor to finish the 
project earlier than the deadline. 
 Contractor’s cash outflows associated with an activity can occur anytime throughout 
its execution. However, it is assumed here that they are discounted to the starting time of the 
activity. The cash inflows for the contractor, which represent the cash outflows for the client, 
occur at predetermined equal time intervals. In this context, the earned value for the 
contractor corresponds to the payments regarding the activities completed within that specific 
period of time. The payments are specified as the sum of the costs incurred for all activities 
completed from the last payment point until the current payment point and multiplied with (1 
+ β), where β is the profit margin. Note that activities in progress are not included in this sum. 
The problem is formulated under zero-lag finish-start precedence constraints and multi-mode 
renewable resource constraints. 
The bargaining objective function is expected to reflect the two-party nature of the 
problem environment. The bargaining objective function seeks a compromise between the 
client and the contractor. The bargaining power concept is introduced into the problem by the 
bargaining power weights used in the bargaining objective function. Further details of this 
function are given in Section 3.  
The weight parameter as a notion of bargaining power is also used in the mathematical 
economics literature. For instance, Ervig and Haake [10] discuss the notion of weights for two 
agents that are involved in two different bargaining problems. Under certain assumptions 
about the class of bargaining problems and the individual utilities, they thoroughly analyze 
the equilibrium conditions. Again within the game theory field, Köbberling and Peters [23] 
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investigate the effect of decision weights in the bargaining problems. These decision weights 
are incorporated through probabilistic weight functions that determine the risk attitude of a 
decision maker. By varying the engaged agents’ attitudes towards risk, they discuss the 
different outcomes of the bargaining games. 
Marmol et al. [24] analyze an equitable solution for the multi-criteria bargaining 
games. To deal with the multiple objectives, they minimize the maximum deviation from the 
best minimum payoff values, which can be attained when the problem is solved for each 
individual criterion. To this extent, the distance concept in their study bears some similar 
features to the one used in the present study. However, Marmol et al. [24] do not consider the 
concept of bargaining powers. In the present paper, the bargaining power weights reflecting 
the respective powers of the involved parties cause significant nonlinearities in the objective 
function. If applied in our work (after some modifications), the solution approach suggested 
by Marmol et al. [24] would result in a nonlinear constrained integer programming problem - 
an extremely difficult problem to solve. In this paper, the bargaining power weights are 
defined to introduce the impact of the difference in relative bargaining positions of the client 
and the contractor. Furthermore, they are meant to reflect perceived quantities and do not 
represent exact point values. The bargaining objective function introduced is formulated using 
a max min approach so as to improve the position of the worse-off party among the client and 
the contractor, which would correspond to an acceptable position for both parties for the given 
bargaining power weights. Köbberling and Peters [23] have investigated the effect of decision 
weights in bargaining problems through the concept of probability weighting functions. In 
their approach, the solution to the bargaining problem depends exclusively on its image in 
utility space. Ervig and Haake [10] view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be 
traded in exchange economy involving two countries. The final solution they define satisfies 
two main properties. First, it should be Pareto optimal in the aggregate, i.e., there is no other 
package of subsidies and expenditures that makes both countries better off. This is the same 
property adopted in the present study as well; that is, the objective function aims at finding the 
solution, which ensures that there is no other point in the utility space that brings players to a 
better position at the aggregate level. The second property states that, if one compares the 
final solution with the scenario, in which the players are treated separately, then neither of the 
players should be worse off in the final solution. So the favor exchange really should do a 
favor to both. In the present study, the bargain between players doesn’t constitute a favor 
exchange, but instead a pure trade-off among benefits is obtained. Mármol et al. [24] propose 
a solution concept for multi-criteria bargaining games, which is based on the distance to a 
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utopian minimum level vector. The distance concept they introduce in their study is similar to 
the distance definition used in this study, in a way that both identify the distance from the 
minimum level point for both players.  
In practice, both the client and the contractor or an external consultant may use the 
overall approach presented here to reach a mutual agreement point through a series of trade-
offs. It provides an environment for scenario analysis, which the interested parties may utilize.  
 
3. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
 
In this section, the formal mathematical programming model for the multi-mode 
resource constrained bargaining problem with progress payments is given. In the subsequent 
discussion, the following notation is employed: 
J is the set of activities, where i, j ∈  J denote the general activity indices, and |J| 
denotes the last activity. 
K is the set of resource types, where k∈K denotes the resource index.  
Mj is the set of modes for activity j∈J, where m∈Mj denotes the mode index; the 
convention employed here is that as the mode number increases, the resource usage decreases 
and the activity duration increases. 
t and q denote the time periods.  
ip  j : precedence relation; i.e., activity i∈J precedes activity j∈J. 
Ej : earliest finishing time of activity j∈J. 
Lj : latest finishing time of activity j∈J. 
djm : duration of activity j∈J in mode m∈Mj. 
D : predetermined deadline  
rjkm  : consumption of resource k∈K per unit time for activity j∈J in mode m∈Mj. 
Rk : availability limit of resource k∈K. 
Cmax : makespan. 
Cjm : cost of activity j∈J in mode m∈Mj in real terms discounted to the starting time 
of the activity. 
β : profit margin. 
γ : discount rate per period. 
αt : continuous discount factor in period t, exp(-γt).  
Tn : predetermined payment times, n = 1, …, N with  T1 = 0 and TN = D. 
PTn : client’s payment at period Tn, n = 1, …, N. 
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xjtm: 1, if activity j∈J  is completed in period t with mode m∈Mj ; 0, otherwise. 
x: the decision vector with components xjtm ; i.e., the schedule. 
F: feasible region of the overall problem. 
 
The constraints are as follows: 
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The constraint set (1) ensures that each activity is assigned. The constraint set (2) 
makes sure that all precedence relations are satisfied. The constraint (3) secures that the 
project is completed on or before the deadline. The constraint set (4) makes sure that for every 
single resource the required amount does not exceed the corresponding resource constraint at 
any given point in time throughout the project duration. The last set of constraints (5) shows 
that the variables are binary. Notice that a decision variable is feasible when it satisfies the 
above constraints. In other words, the feasible region of the problem is given by 
F = {x : x satisfies constraints (1) – (5) }. 
Next, the bargaining objective of the mathematical model is presented. Let fA and fB 
denote the individual objective function value of the client (A) and the contractor (B), 
respectively. Then, we have 
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Suppose that x*A and x
*
B are the optimal solutions for the client and the contractor over the 
feasible region, respectively. Formally, 
x
*
A := arg max {fA(x) : x∈F },                                                                            (9) 
x
*
B := arg max {fB(x) : x∈F },                                                                           (10) 
Using now (6) and (7), the optimal objective function values for the client and the contractor 
are defined as f”A : = fA(x
*
A) and f”B : = fB(x
*
B), respectively. To introduce the objective of the 
bargaining problem, we define for the client the value f’A : = fA(x
*
B) and for the contractor the 
value f’B : = fB(x
*
A). These are the undesired values for the respective parties, and are defined 
as the objective function value for the player at the optimal solution of the other player. 
After these definitions, the bargaining objective of our mathematical model becomes 
max min 
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where w(A) ∈  (0,1) and w(B) ∈  (0,1) with w(A) + w(B) = 1 denote the bargaining power 
weights for the client and the contractor, respectively. The terms in parentheses in the 
bargaining objective function are called the bargaining values for the client and the 
contractor, respectively. The bargaining value raised to power by the bargaining power weight 
results in the weighted bargaining value, where a higher value is more desirable for both 
parties. The fundamental metric proposed in the bargaining objective function formulation is 
the normalized distance of the party involved from the respective undesired solution. The 
bargaining objective function tries to maximize the minimum of the normalized distances of 
the objective function values of the client fA(x) and of the contractor fB(x) from f'A and f'B, 
respectively. In other words, the bargaining objective function is formulated so as to improve 
the position of the worse-off party among the client and the contractor.  
The relative bargaining positions of the client and the contractor differ in general. To 
introduce the impact of this difference in relative bargaining positions, bargaining power 
weights are defined for both the client and the contractor. A large bargaining power weight 
implies a strong bargaining position. For each player, the optimal solution is the result of the 
respective single objective problem solved by a commercial solver. These values are 
employed in the bargaining objective function for normalization.  
The overall mathematical model considered in this paper is given as follows: 
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The above mathematical programming formulation is a non-linear zero-one programming 
problem. Hence, one would expect that exact methods would fail even for moderate size 
problems. 
Note that the base model above considers the progress payment model at predetermined time 
intervals. The last payment period is scheduled at the deadline. The second payment model 
considered in this paper is the one with payments at activity completions. In this case, the 
term PTn in the above mathematical model should be replaced by 
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4. SOLUTION APPROACHES 
 
Conventional solution procedures for the resource constrained project scheduling 
problem with discounted cash flows adopt the perspective of either the client or the 
contractor. Hence, these procedures developed for optimizing the benefit for one party only 
would not be expected to produce good solutions for the bargaining objective, which aims to 
merge the objectives of both the client and the contractor into a single bargaining objective 
function. The optimization of such a bargaining objective function does not depend on 
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structured rules like completing the costly activities earlier, or delaying the project. For 
instance, delaying a costly activity may be beneficial for the contractor but if the client’s 
weighted bargaining value is less than the contractor’s, the bargaining objective function 
value may be decreased; or delaying an activity may not have an effect at all. The max min 
objective function itself invalidates such structured rules. Rather than devising an algorithm 
based on heuristic decision rules, it has been decided to employ two different meta-heuristics, 
SA and GA, in order to exploit their well-established capability of searching through the 
solution space effectively. Since the same solution representation and generation are 
employed both in SA and GA, a description of these is provided first. 
 
4.1 Solution Representation  
A solution is represented by a combination of three serial lists: activity list, mode list, 
and idle time list. The structure of these lists is as follows: 
1. Activity List: 
Activity list is a precedence-feasible permutation of activities. The dummy source and 
sink nodes are placed at the start and at the end of the list, respectively, by default. The 
list represents the priority ordering for the starting time of activities. That is, an 
activity appearing earlier in the list should start at the same time or at an earlier time 
than its immediate follower.  
2.Mode List:  
The mode list shows the assigned modes for each activity in the activity list.  
3.Idle Time List:  
The idle time value represents the exact idle time to be inserted before the start of the 
corresponding activity in the activity list.  
An example for a 14-activity network is as given in Figure 1.  In the example, the 
dummy activity 1 is assigned mode 1 and its start is delayed by 1 unit time, while activity 3 is 
assigned mode 2 and its starting time is delayed by 4 units of time. 
-------------------------------- 
Place Figure 1 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
 
4.2 Feasible Solution Generation 
Feasible solutions are generated as follows. A list of eligible activities is kept, which is 
initially composed of activities with no predecessors. One of the activities from this set is 
randomly chosen to be inserted into the next position on the activity list. Then the eligible set 
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is updated by deleting the activity chosen and by inserting activities, all predecessors of which 
have already been inserted into the activity list.    
For each feasible activity list, a set of random mode and idle time lists are generated 
among which a feasible combination is searched for. For each triple of activity list, mode list, 
and idle time list, the feasibility is checked according to both the resource limitations, and the 
deadline. Infeasible solutions are discarded. Problem sets used in tests are redefined by 
extending the deadlines for each problem set versus the original problem sets; details are 
given in Section 5 on computational results. 
 
4.3. Simulated Annealing Method 
4.3.1. Neighborhood Generation Mechanism 
Neighboring solutions are generated by altering the three lists; i.e. the activity, mode 
and idle time lists. All feasible solutions generated by the mechanisms explained below are 
included in the neighborhood. 
a. Activity Replacement: An activity is chosen randomly and is moved together with its 
corresponding mode and idle time assignments to each one of the feasible alternative 
locations one by one. All feasible neighboring solutions are generated by applying the 
replacement operator.  
b. Mode Change: By keeping the activity list and the idle time list constant, mode 
changes are applied, one mode at a time. All possible mode changes for all activities 
are tried. 
c. Idle Time Change: By keeping the activity list and the mode list constant, idle time 
changes are applied, one at a time. All possible idle time changes for all activities are 
tried. For each of the activities all possible idle time changes are investigated by 
checking the feasibility of the solution on two dimensions, namely the deadline and 
the resource availability. 
The solutions that yield negative numerators in the bargaining objective function are 
ignored since such solutions are clearly inferior. This guarantees that no adopted schedule can 
provide one of the players a value worse than f’, which is the objective function value of that 
player at the optimal solution of the other player.  
4.3.2. Cooling mechanism 
The cooling scheme used here is a scheme effectively used by other researchers on 
complex problems ([3, 32]). The details are given below: 
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Tinit =(fmin-fmax)/(ln PA
init
)                                                                                          (15) 
cr = (ln PAinit / ln PA f ) 1/(maxIter-1)  (16) 
Tcurr = cr * Tcurr                                                                                                         (17) 
where cr is the cooling rate, Tinit and Tcurr are the initial and current temperatures, respectively; 
PA
init and PA
f are the initial and final acceptance probabilities, respectively; fmin and fmax are the 
minimum and maximum bargaining objective function values observed in an initial set of 
solutions, respectively; and maxIter is the maximum number of temperature reduction cycles. 
4.3.3. Stopping Criterion 
A fixed iteration count taken as the maximum number of temperature reduction cycles 
(maxIter) is adopted as the stopping criterion. The number of iterations carried for each 
problem depends on the number of activities; higher number of iterations is required in order 
to improve the objective function once the activity number of the problem increases. The 
(maxIter) value is determined based on several test runs on each type of problem – that is the 
minimum iteration count which delivers all observed improvement in the objective functions. 
Since the bargaining objective function is in max min format, the same bargaining objective 
function value may be observed at different solution points. Hence, other stopping criteria 
based on objective value improvements are not appropriate for the current problem. A record 
of the best solution ever encountered is kept throughout the run and is reported as the SA 
solution at termination. 
4.3.4. The Algorithm 
Step1: Find an initial solution and adopt it as the current solution S. Determine Tinit and cr. 
Take Tcurr as Tinit. 
Step2: Generate all alternative solutions in the neighborhood of S.  
Step3: Select randomly a solution S’ from the neighborhood of S. If S’ represents a better 
solution than S in terms of the bargaining objective, adopt S’ as the current solution If S’ 
represents a worse solution than S, adopt it as the current solution with probability of 
acceptance PA=e
-(∆z/Tcurr), where ∆z denotes the absolute difference between the bargaining 
objective function values of S and S’. If S’ is adopted as the current solution S, then go to Step 
2. Repeat Step 3 until the number of neighborhood solutions tested reaches Ntest.  
Step 4: If the number of temperature reduction cycles reaches maxIter, then terminate. If not, 
then update Tcurr and go to Step 2. 
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4.4. Genetic Algorithm 
GA is applied by using the chromosome representation explained in Section 4.1 and 
exemplified in Figure 1. The initial population is generated employing the feasible solution 
generation mechanism explained in Section 4.2. The fitness value is set equal to the objective 
function value. Roulette wheel selection mechanism is employed, where the probability of 
selection is proportional to an individual’s fitness [13]. Elitist selection is also applied such 
that the best few chromosomes are transferred directly to the new generation. 
4.4.1. Crossover Operator 
The most challenging problem when applying GA to multi-mode resource constrained 
scheduling problems is to reproduce feasible off-springs. The Multi Component Uniform 
Order Based Crossover (MCUOX) is employed, which preserves precedence feasibility when 
generating one offspring from parent chromosomes [31]. In this operator, one of the parents is 
selected randomly. Starting from the first activity, the next activity on that parent not assigned 
to the offspring yet is found. Then the mode assignment of that activity on each of the parents 
is determined and one is selected randomly. Finally, the idle time assignment of that activity 
on each of the parents is determined and one is selected randomly. This procedure is repeated 
until an offspring is generated fully.  
4.4.2. Mutation Operators 
• Activity replacement: A parent chromosome is selected randomly. Then an activity is 
selected randomly from the activity list of that chromosome. Next the position of that 
particular activity on the activity list is changed as follows. Activity’s replacement 
window is determined according to the precedence relations - replacement window for 
an activity is basically the window within the activity list between the slot where the 
predecessors of that specific activity ends and the slot where the successors of that 
specific activity starts.  The activity together with its mode and idle time assignments 
is moved to a location within the replacement window, and the whole list is adjusted 
accordingly. If the new solution satisfies all feasibility constraints, then it is accepted 
as an offspring.  
• Bit mutation: Bit mutation is applied either to the mode or to the idle time assignment 
dimension following a four-step approach: First, for each chromosome, it’s decided 
whether to bit mutate it or not. Once it is decided to apply bit mutation to a 
chromosome, the type of bit mutation, the activity to be mutated, and the direction of 
change are selected in sequence. If the mode bit mutation is going to be applied, the 
existing mode of the activity is replaced with another randomly chosen mode value. If 
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the idle time bit mutation is going to be applied, the existing idle time value is either 
decreased by 1 (if it is not 0), or increased by 1, where decision is randomly taken with 
0.5 probability on each alternative of decreasing and increasing the current idle time. 
4.4.3. Population Management  
The GA pool management scheme is shown in Figure 2. New generations are formed 
by the offspring of the crossover and the activity replacement mutation operators, the best 
individuals selected according to the elitist strategy, and fitness-based selected individuals. Bit 
mutation is applied to the members of this new population except the elites. 
-------------------------------- 
Place Figure 2 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
4.4.4. Termination 
The whole cycle of generating a new population is repeated for 50-100 times, 
depending on the problem size. At each generation, the chromosome with the highest fitness 
value ever is kept in memory. The final solution is the solution with the best fitness value 
reached ever after the last cycle.  
 
5. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
 
The test problems used are adopted from the project scheduling problem library 
PSPLIB ([20, 21]). The adoption has been made by eliminating the tardiness costs, relaxing 
the deadlines, and excluding the nonrenewable resources. For each problem size of 14, 20, 
and 32 activities, problem sets consisting of 30 problems are used adding up to a total of 90 
test problems. Problems are selected from Multi-Mode Resource Constrained Project 
Scheduling Problem (MRCPSP) directory of PSPLIB.  Within this directory following data 
sets are used for problems with 14, 20, and 32 activities respectively: j12.mm, j18.mm, and 
j30.mm. Within each of these sets there are around 550 problems, and among these 30 
problems are selected randomly from each data set. These problem sets had been modified by 
disregarding non-renewable resources and extending the deadlines in order to increase 
feasibility. These modified data sets are provided in Kavlak [16]. All of the problem sets used 
involve two renewable resources and three modes for the activities. The first mode consists of 
the highest activity cost with the shortest duration, and the last mode consists of the lowest 
activity cost with the longest duration. Initially, in order to investigate the behavior of the 
model and the performance of the solution procedures, in all tests the bargaining power 
weight of both the client and the contractor are set equal to 0.5.  
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For each problem set, initial solutions are generated as described in Section 4.2. First 
the activity lists are generated, then mode and idle time lists are generated randomly, and the 
resulting chromosome is subjected to feasibility checks. Table 1 illustrates the percentage of 
feasibility hits.  
-------------------------------- 
Place Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
In SA, PA
init is set at 0.95, and PA
f is set to 0.001. A set of 100 solutions are generated 
using the feasible solution generation mechanism explained in Section 4.2 to determine the 
fmin and fmax values. Modifying the temperature plateau length, i.e. the number of neighbors 
tested at a given temperature level, has also been tested, but no significant improvement 
regarding the solution has been observed. Hence, Ntest is set at 100. The fixed iteration count 
maxIter for each problem set is given in Table 2. 
-------------------------------- 
Place Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
GA follows a two step pool management strategy as shown in Figure 2. When moving 
from the old population to the new one, elites constitute 2%, fitness-based selected individuals 
constitute 48%, off-springs generated by MCUOX operator constitute 33%, and off-springs 
generated by activity replacement operator constitute 17% of each new population.  
The offspring generation process through MCUOX continues until the number of 
feasible offspring reaches 1/3rd of the original population. This proportion is a design choice, 
which enables highest improvement at each iteration when compared with other tested ratios 
of 1/6, 1/4, and 1/2. 
Activity replacement mutation operator is applied to randomly selected individuals 
from the original population until the number of feasible individuals reaches 1/6th of the 
population. This proportion is again a design choice which enables highest improvement at 
each iteration when compared with other tested ratios of 1/4 and 1/3. These ratios were tested 
for 9 problem sets of which 3 have 14-activities, 3 have 20-activities, and the last 3 have 32-
activities. Results showed that for all instances MCUOX offspring generation process 
continuing until the number of feasible offspring reaches 1/3rd of the original populations 
provided the highest improvement in the objective function. Similarly, continuing with the 
activity replacement mutation operator until the number of feasible offspring reaches 1/6th of 
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the original populations provided for all instances the highest improvement in the objective 
function. 
Bit mutation is applied with a four step approach, where selection probability is equal 
for the alternatives at each step. Figure 3 illustrates the bit mutation mechanism. 
-------------------------------- 
Place Figure 3 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 provides average percent deviations of the GA and SA solutions from the 
optimal solutions obtained by using the commercial solver GAMS 20.0. The t-test results 
stating whether GA delivering higher objective function values than SA is statistically 
significant or not are also reported in Table 3. With payments at 10 time periods and 
payments at 5 time periods, it is observed that GA delivering better results than SA is 
statistically significant, but it is not statistically significant for the instances with payments at 
activity completions. These results show that as the frequency of the payments increases and 
the number of activities decreases, better results are obtained and the likelihood of finding 
near optimal solutions increases, no matter which method is used. It is clear that the problem 
is getting more complex with increasing numbers of activities as can be seen from the 
increasing deviations for increasing numbers of activities in the rows of Table 3. As can be 
observed from the columns of Table 3, the deviations decrease with increasing frequency of 
payments, which indicates that the problem becomes less complex in that direction.  
-------------------------------- 
Place Table 3 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
 
All tests are carried out on a Toshiba A10-S503 with Mobile Intel Celeron 2.20 GHz 
CPU, and 256 MB of RAM. Average CPU times for all test instances are given in Table 4. 
Here, for both SA and GA the number of objective function evaluations within the 
computational time is compatible. Still it is observed that the computation takes a little longer 
for GA when compared with SA at each instance. The reason for this may be due to the effort 
spent for the management of the objective function ranking list employed in GA to determine 
the elites. 
-------------------------------- 
Place Table 4 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
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6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
Sensitivity analyses are conducted for three important parameters used in the model:  
the profit margin, the payment discount rate, and the bargaining power weight. For profit 
margin and discount rate tests, exact optimal solutions obtained by using commercial solver 
GAMS.20.0 are used. For profit margin and discount rate tests, bargaining power weight of 
the players are kept constant and equivalent at 0.5. Hence, the effects of these two parameters 
are tested under equal conditions for both of the players. Bargaining power weight tests are 
held for varying discount rate γ  with constant profit margin β at 0.1. In these tests, GA 
solutions are employed, since optimal solutions for these problems could not be delivered by 
the commercial solver due to the non-linear nature of the problem.    
Since the client pays a profit margin β over the total cost at the predetermined payment 
points, the number and amount of each payment PT depends on the payment frequency, which 
is another parameter of the whole model. In this sense, both payments at activity completions 
and payments at every 5 time periods payment models are tested. The client prefers less 
frequent payments, which leads to bulk payments, whereas the contractor prefers more 
frequent payments in order to be able to receive its return on investment as soon as possible. 
That is, while the client prefers payment for each specific activity deferred, the contractor 
prefers payments at activity completions. This brings a trade-off between the profit margin β 
and the frequency of the payments. Since increasing the profit margin or the payment 
frequency both brings an NPV change in the same direction, the tests show that, depending on 
both β and the discount rate γ , there is a trade-off between them at a constant NPV point. 
Although all these changes affect NPVs of the players, they don’t have an affect on the 
bargaining power weights of either side. The reason is that, once a specific parameter is 
defined in the model, it is pursued as given in all individual calculations (f ”A, f ”B, f’A, and f’B 
values), so even if one observes a significant effect on the NPVs, one doesn’t see any 
bargaining power weight  effect in the decision making process. 
The sensitivity analyses are conducted on 30 test problems with 14 activities. As an 
example, the project network and the mode structure of the activities for one of the test 
problems are given in Figure 4 and Table 5, respectively. In all the test problems employed 
here, payments are due every 5 time periods. In this section, the different sensitivity analyses 
results are displayed as Box and Whisker plots, which give five number summaries: the 
smallest observation, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, and largest observation. 
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                                                -------------------------------- 
Place Figure 4 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
-------------------------------- 
Place Table 5 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
 
6.1 Sensitivity Analysis for the Profit Margin  
Within the model, the profit margin β directly affects the amount of payment made by 
the client to the contractor at each payment point (refer to Equation (8)).  
When the schedule is kept constant, increasing β would clearly increase the objective 
function value of the contractor, and decrease the objective function value of the client and 
vice versa. Since the schedule itself is also a decision variable in the model, the model is run 
with different β values (0.010; 0.250; 0.500) at different discount rate γ levels (0.005; 0.010; 
0.100). In Figures 5(a)–(c), examples can be found from a series of tests that display the best 
bargaining value (i.e., the minimum of the weighted bargaining values for the client and the 
contractor) for increasing profit margin β at different γ levels. In these figures, since the 
values for the client and the contractor are very close to each other, only the smaller of the 
weighted bargaining values for the client and the contractor are displayed.  
                                           ---------------------------------------- 
Place Figure 5(a)–(c) about here 
                                                        --------------------------------------- 
 
Here, it is observed that there is no correlation between β and the smaller weighted 
bargaining value. The main reason for this is the direct effect of β on payments at each 
payment time. Since variations of the payments in-between payment periods have significant 
effect on the adopted schedule, β exercises a major effect on the final schedule. Hence, the 
contractor can not always maintain his advantage on increased β. This result can be observed 
from Table 6, which shows the player whose weighted bargaining value corresponds to the 
bargaining objective function value at each β level. Since the model has a max min objective 
function, that particular player is the one who is less satisfied due to the inferior weighted 
bargaining value. 
-------------------------------- 
Place Table 6 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
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From Table 6, it is observed that there is no specific pattern. This results from the 
client’s move for offsetting the contractor’s profit margin advantage by causing major 
changes in the overall schedule. That is, β is not the single determinant, and other factors 
influence the outcome regarding the minimum of the weighted bargaining values. 
Contrary to that, a direct relation is detected between the profit margin β and the 
objective function values of the client fA(x) and the contractor fB(x). Namely, as β increases, 
the objective function value of the client decreases and that of the contractor increases as 
expected. For the problem set, where γ is taken as 0.100, which is fairly high when compared 
to other tests, the initial values for both of the players at β = 0.10 are relatively close to each 
other, which indicates a trade-off between β and γ. The details of the progression of the 
objective function values for both players are shown in Table 7 displaying the average values 
over 30 test problems and for γ=0.010 in Figure 6. 
-------------------------------- 
Place Table 7 about here 
                                                --------------------------------- 
-------------------------------- 
Place Figure 6 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
 
6.2 Sensitivity Analysis for the Discount Rate  
In the bargaining model, discount rate γ is used in NPV calculations within the 
objective functions of the players as given in Equations (6) and (7). Discount rate γ may affect 
the schedule preferences of the players due to different payment amounts at each payment 
point, and due to the fact that the contractor pays activity costs in advance although s/he 
receives payments only at upcoming payment points or activity completion. This shows that 
the level of discount rate γ affects the contractor in two aspects, whereas it affects the client 
only in one. An increase in γ is a source of an increase in the objective function value for the 
client and just the opposite for the contractor. The details are given in Table 8 displaying the 
average values over 30 test problems and for β=0.25 in Figure 7. 
---------------------------------- 
Place Table 8 about here 
                                                           ---------------------------------- 
-------------------------------- 
Place Figure 7 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
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The schedule manipulations due to changes in the discount rate γ have more effect on 
the contractor’s weighted bargaining value than they have on the client’s. Test results are 
presented in Figures 8 (a)-(c), where only the smaller of the weighted bargaining values for 
the client and the contractor are displayed, since the values for the client and contractor are 
very close to each other. Here, it is clearly seen that increasing γ leads to increased weighted 
bargaining values. Consequently, the client and the contractor move to a position that is more 
desirable for them. The main reason for this is that as γ increases, the objective function value 
fB for the contractor decreases due to decreased net realization. This leads the bargaining 
model to introduce schedule improvements to decrease the effects of γ from which the 
contractor benefits at the expense of the client’s benefit. Although these changes still result in 
inferior fB value for the contractor when compared with the results of cases with lower γ, the 
percentage increase in individual objective function value within the bargaining model itself 
is higher for both players, since the benefit of the client is coupled with schedule changes that 
the contractor benefits from. 
---------------------------------------- 
Place Figure 8 (a)-(c) about here 
                                                       ---------------------------------------- 
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis for Bargaining Power Weights  
Within the model the bargaining power weight for each player is applied in the final 
step of the bargaining objective function evaluation in order to set the exact realized value for 
the players. The bargaining objective function is presented below again for convenience. 
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Recall that in these tests, γ=0.05 and β=0.1, and the bargaining power weights of the 
client and the contractor add up to 1. The summary of the bargaining power weight tests 
conducted are given in Table 9 displaying the average values over 30 test problems.  
-------------------------------- 
Place Table 9 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
The analysis of the bargaining values in Table 9 leads to the observation that, when the 
gap between the bargaining powers of the parties increases, the realized weighted bargaining 
values increase for both of the players. This is due to the fact that, if one of the players starts 
with a small bargaining power, his/her realized bargaining value increases considerably with 
increasing bargaining power, so that the other party tries to catch this increase by schedule 
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changes. Objective function values for the players follow a similar trend as the weighted 
bargaining values do with respect to bargaining power weight.  
Table 10 represents schedule examples at different bargaining power values. As the 
bargaining weight of the client increases, the contractor tries to compensate by changing the 
schedule.  The contractor accomplishes this by adjusting the modes and the idle times.  As can 
be observed in Table 10, on the average, the duration of the activities increase and the idle 
times decrease as the bargaining weight moves from the contractor to the client. This is a 
behaviour we expect to be valid in general. However, the changes in the duration and idle 
times for individual activities are not necessarily monotonic. For example, the mode for 
activity 13 is increased first, then decreased and later increased again. The delay time for 
activity 4, for example, is first decreased, then increased, and finally decreased again.  
--------------------------------- 
Place Table 10 about here 
            ---------------------------------   
The average weighted bargaining values over 30 test problems for each player at 
different bargaining power weight couples are displayed for varying discount rates γ in Table 
11 and in Figure 9 for γ=0.02. In Figure 9, only the smaller of the weighted bargaining values 
for the client and the contractor are displayed, since the values for the client and contractor are 
very close to each other. Here, one observes that, when the gap between bargaining power 
weights of the parties increases, the realized weighted bargaining values increase for both of 
the players. This is due to the fact that, if one of the players has a small bargaining power 
weight, his/her realized weighted bargaining value increases considerably, so that the other 
party tries to catch this increase by schedule changes.  On the other hand, as discount rate γ 
increases, it is observed that both the client and the contractor become more content with 
increasing weighted bargaining values for all bargaining power weight couples. Although the 
change in γ doesn’t change the pattern of increasing weighted bargaining values as the gap 
between bargaining power weights of the parties’ increases, it is observed that the percentage 
change on the weighted bargaining values is decreased as γ increases. In other words, at high 
discount rate γ, there is less room for bargaining value improvements introduced by schedule 
changes when the gap between bargaining power weights of the parties is high. 
-------------------------------- 
Place Table 11 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
-------------------------------- 
Place Figure 9 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
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The progression of bargaining values of the players is illustrated in Figure 10, from 
which the direct relationship between the bargaining power weights and the bargaining values 
can be observed. 
---------------------------------- 
Place Figure 10 about here 
                                                           ---------------------------------- 
Objective function values for the players follow a similar trend as the weighted 
bargaining values do with respect to bargaining power weight. In Figure 11, one clearly 
observes this trend.  
-------------------------------- 
Place Figure 11 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
 
Increasing the profit margin, the discount rate, or the bargaining power weight, with 
everything else staying constant, leads to six key trends in the objective function values of the 
players, which are summarized in Table 12. 
 --------------------------------- 
Place Table 12 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
 
7. AN EXTENSION OF THE BARGAINING MODEL 
 
The bargaining model formulation is enriched by introducing a benefit term into the 
objective function of the client as a function of completion earlier than the predetermined 
deadline. In this extended bargaining model, the client receives a constant amount of benefit 
per each time period that the project is completed earlier than the deadline. No cost, on the 
other hand, is imposed on the client through the contractor. In a sense, this model proposes an 
additional benefit generated in the system regardless of any value trade off. To obtain the 
extended bargaining model, the base mathematical model is modified by replacing the client’s 
objective function value with the following function: 
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where σ is the client’s benefit per time period resulting from early completion. 
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One of the more important impacts of this extension is on the adopted schedule. To 
demonstrate this, the example problem given earlier in Figure 4 and Table 5 is solved for 
different values of σ and the schedules obtained are displayed in Table 13. It is observed that 
as σ increases, the adopted schedule changes in a way that the project tends to finish earlier by 
choosing modes with higher cost and less duration. Similar analysis is carried for the 
remaining test problems. In all those tests, the schedule moves reported above are observed to 
be typical for all tested instances. The key conclusion reached as a result of the test problem 
solutions is that both players gain out of the benefit resulting from early completion. This 
leads to increases in the bargaining objective function value and the individual objective 
function values for both players due to the structure of the bargaining objective.  
 
--------------------------------- 
Place Table 13 about here 
                                                            --------------------------------- 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have investigated the client-contractor bargaining problem in the 
context of multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling. The bargaining objective is to 
maximize the bargaining objective function comprised of the minimum of individual NPV 
maximizing objectives of both the client and the contractor.  
In this context, we have proposed two main solution methods, namely SA and GA 
approaches. Based on comparisons with the optimal results obtained by using a commercial 
solver (GAMS 20.0), one can conclude that GA has provided better results than SA. 
Sensitivity analyses results show that profit margin increase doesn’t cause significant 
changes in the bargaining objective function value, but it has effect on objective function 
value of the players. That is, even if one of the parameters changes in favor of a player, the 
bargaining mechanism offsets this advantage with schedule changes. For example, even if 
increasing the profit margin seems to be increasing the objective function value of the 
contractor, when the bargain ends, the contractor does not necessarily end up with an 
advantageous position.  
As expected, the objective function value of the contractor increases with increasing 
profit margin, whereas the objective function value of the client decreases. The tests we have 
conducted on the discount rate show that, although an increase in the bargaining objective 
function is observed with increasing discount rate, this is not a monotonic increase. However, 
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variation in the discount rate has significant impact on the objective functions of the players. 
The objective function value of the contractor decreases with increasing profit margin, 
whereas the objective function value of the client increases. Weight tests implemented show 
that bargaining power weights have significant impact on the solution, not only on the 
weighted bargaining values of the players but also on the objective function values of the 
players.  
During the problem solving stage, which appears as the bargaining stage, the variables 
interact with each other. For example, an increase in the profit margin has an impact in the 
same direction as an increase in the bargaining power weight of the contractor as would be 
expected  or vice versa. There are various means of bargaining. The bargaining process is not 
only affected by the bargaining power weights. An increase in the profit rate can be tried to be 
counterbalanced by schedule adjustments. Likewise, if the discount rates are increasing due to 
market dynamics, the contractor may try to compensate for its loss by offering an increase on 
profit margin, which has a positive effect on the objective function value of the contractor.  
An extension to the base model has also been investigated by introducing a benefit 
term into the objective function of the client as a function of completion earlier than the 
predetermined deadline. The key conclusion we have reached based on these benefit tests is 
that both players gain out of the benefit resulting from early completion. This leads to 
increases in the bargaining objective function value and the individual objective function 
values for both players due to the structure of the bargaining objective.  
Although various analyses on the parameters have been conducted, still a series of 
combinations is open for research through the proposed model. The effect of bargaining 
power weights on different payment models may be an important source of analysis for 
further investigation of the problem. The influence of the bargaining power weights and the 
types of payment model on the model outcomes can be investigated. Other payment models 
not considered here may also be investigated using various solution procedures. A further 
study can be the investigation on a benefit sharing model between the client and the contractor 
for the increased benefit due to early completion. For example, a model, which will study the 
trade off between the client’s benefit and the contractor’s bonus for early completion, may 
produce further interesting results. 
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Activity List 1 3 2 5 6 4 9 10 8 7 13 11 12 14 
               
Mode List 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 
               
Idle Time List 1 4 5 3 1 3 0 4 1 2 3 0 1 1 
               
Duration 0 3 2 4 2 4 2 1 2 3 2 2 3 4 
               
Starting Time 1 5 6 11 9 4 15 19 16 13 23 20 21 26 
               
Finishing Time 1 8 8 15 11 8 17 20 18 16 25 22 24 30 
 
Figure 1.  Solution representation (chromosome) for a 14-activity problem 
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Figure 2. GA pool management scheme 
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Figure 3. Bit mutation flow chart 
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Figure 4. Project network for the example problem  
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Figure 5 (a). Weighted bargaining values at different profit margin levels (γ =0.005) 
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Figure 5 (b). Weighted bargaining values at different profit margin levels (γ =0.010) 
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Figure 5 (c). Weighted bargaining values at different profit margin levels (γ =0.100) 
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Figure 6. Objective function values at different profit margin levels (γ=0.010) 
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Figure 7. Objective function values at different discount rate levels (β=0.25) 
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Figure 8 (a). Weighted bargaining values at different discount rate levels (β=0.10) 
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Figure 8 (b). Weighted bargaining values at different discount rate levels (β=0.25) 
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Figure 8 (c). Weighted bargaining values at different discount rate levels (β=0.50) 
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Figure 9.  Weighted bargaining values vs. bargaining power weights (γ=0.020) 
 
 
 
Client's Bargaining Value
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
w 1 w2 w 3 w4 w 5 w6 w 7 w 8 w 9
bargaining weights
Contractor's Bargaining Value
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
w 1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w 9
bargaining weights
 
Figure 10. Bargaining values of the players vs. bargaining power weights 
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Figure 11. Objective function values of the players vs. bargaining power weights 
 
 
Table 1. Percentage of feasibility hits for each problem set 
  14-activity problems 20-activity problems 32-activity problems 
Number of mode lists generated for 
each activity list 60 100 140 
Number of idle time lists generated 
for each activity list 60 100 140 
Percentage of feasible solution hits 16% 10% 7% 
 
 
 
Table 2. Iteration counts for each problem set 
  14-activity problems 20-activity problems 32-activity problems 
maxIter 1000 2000 5000 
 
 
Table 3. Average percent deviations from the optimal solutions and t-test results  
 % deviations 
 SA GA 
T-Test (p=0.05) 
 
14 activity 
network 
20 activity 
network 
32 activity 
network 
14 activity 
network 
20 activity 
network 
32 activity 
network 
14 activity 
network 
20 activity 
network 
32 activity 
network 
Progress 
payments at 10 
time periods 
6% 10% 16% 5% 9% 15% S S S 
Progress 
payments at 5 time 
periods 
4% 8% 14% 3% 7% 13% S S S 
Payments at 
activity completion 
1% 6% 12% 1% 5% 12% IS IS IS 
S: Superiority of GA results over SA results is statistically significant  
IS: Superiority of GA results over SA results is statistically insignificant 
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Table 4. Average CPU times  
 CPU times for SA (seconds) CPU times for GA (seconds) 
14-activity problems 63 74 
20-activity problems 239 265 
32-activity problems 529 564 
 
 
 
Table 5. Mode structure of the activities in the example problem 
 
  activities 
    2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
duration 3 2 3 5 3 3 4 1 5 2 4 3 
cost 130 200 440 110 560 260 98 390 400 250 340 189 
resource 1 10 7 3 6 1 8 2 2 3 0 0 9 
mode 1 
resource 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 1 0 
duration 8 6 3 6 3 5 5 4 8 7 8 3 
cost 80 90 210 78 460 179 45 289 320 147 218 103 
resource 1 9 0 0 4 0 7 0 0 0 0 9 0 
mode 2 
resource 2 0 8 8 0 7 0 7 7 8 9 0 6 
duration 10 10 5 8 4 9 8 9 10 10 9 10 
cost 67 55 100 34 290 98 23 160 170 110 178 65 
resource 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 
mode 3 
resource 2 0 6 4 6 6 10 0 0 7 8 0 4 
 
 
Table 6. Player with the worse weighted bargaining value 
Discount rate γ=0.01 β =0.1 β =0.15 β =0,2 β =0.25 β =0.30 β =0.35 β =0.40 
Minimum objective 
function belongs to: 
Contractor Client Client Client Contractor Client Client 
 
 
Table 7. Objective function values at different profit margin levels 
Objective Function Values β=0.10 β=0.25 β=0.50 
client -2650 -3075 -4175 
γ=0.005 
contractor 286 591 1096 
client -2339 -2756 -3516 
γ=0.010 
contractor 229 497 951 
client -228 -346 -542 
γ=0.100 
contractor -58 53 178 
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Table 8. Objective function values at different discount rate levels 
Objective Function Value γ=0.005 γ=0.01 γ=0.02 γ=0.05 γ=0.10 
client -2650 -2339 -1846 -950 -228 
β=0.10 
contractor 286 229 149 31 -58 
client -3075 -2756 -2233 -1413 -346 
β =0.25 
contractor 591 497 341 203 53 
client -4175 -3516 -2802 -1720 -542 
β =0.50 
contractor 1096 951 730 387 178 
 
 
 
Table 9. Summary of the bargaining power weighted tests (γ=0.05, β=0.10) 
      
Bargaining 
Power  Weight 
Value 
Bargaining 
Value 
Weighted 
Bargaining 
Value 
 Objective  
Function Value 
fA, fB 
client w(A) 0.1 0.186 0.845 -1055 w1 
contractor w(B) 0.9 0.827 0.843 50 
client w(A) 0.2 0.313 0.793 -1015 w2 
contractor w(B) 0.8 0.765 0.807 46 
client w(A) 0.3 0.376 0.746 -995 w3 
contractor w(B) 0.7 0.663 0.750 40 
client w(A) 0.4 0.423 0.709 -980 w4 
contractor w(B) 0.6 0.559 0.706 34 
client w(A) 0.5 0.491 0.701 -958 w5 
contractor w(B) 0.5 0.496 0.704 30 
client w(A) 0.6 0.559 0.705 -937 w6 
contractor w(B) 0.4 0.437 0.718 26 
client w(A) 0.7 0.644 0.735 -910 w7 
contractor w(B) 0.3 0.375 0.745 23 
client w(A) 0.8 0.761 0.804 -873 w8 
contractor w(B) 0.2 0.299 0.785 18 
client w(A) 0.9 0.839 0.854 -849 w9 
contractor w(B) 0.1 0.199 0.851 12 
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Table 10. Schedules at different bargaining power values 
activity list 1 2 3 6 4 7 5 9 8 10 13 11 12 14 
mode list 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 w1 
idle time list 0 2 0 4 3 2 0 0 3 1 2 0 2 0 
activity list 1 2 3 6 4 5 7 9 8 10 13 11 12 14 
mode list 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 w2 
idle time list 0 2 0 4 3 2 0 0 3 1 0 0 2 0 
activity list 1 2 3 6 4 5 7 8 9 10 13 11 12 14 
mode list 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 w3 
idle time list 0 2 0 4 3 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 2 0 
activity list 1 3 2 5 6 7 4 8 9 10 13 11 12 14 
mode list 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 w4 
idle time list 0 0 2 1 4 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 2 0 
activity list 1 2 3 6 5 7 4 8 10 9 11 12 13 14 
mode list 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 w5 
idle time list 0 2 0 4 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 
activity list 1 3 2 4 6 5 7 9 8 10 11 12 13 14 
mode list 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 w6 
idle time list 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 
activity list 1 4 2 3 6 5 7 9 8 10 11 13 12 14 
mode list 1 1 1 3 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 w7 
idle time list 0 3 1 0 4 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 
activity list 1 2 3 6 5 4 10 7 8 9 11 13 12 14 
mode list 1 1 2 3 1 3 1 2 3 2 2 2 3 1 w8 
idle time list 0 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
activity list 1 3 2 6 5 4 10 7 11 9 8 13 12 14 
mode list 1 2 2 3 1 3 1 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 w9 
idle time list 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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Table 11. Weighted bargaining values vs. bargaining power weights  
Weighted Bargaining Values w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 
client 0.810 0.738 0.672 0.619 0.583 0.616 0.672 0.734 0.819 
γ=0.005 
contractor 0.811 0.720 0.678 0.608 0.578 0.620 0.667 0.726 0.824 
client 0.817 0.743 0.682 0.631 0.606 0.634 0.679 0.754 0.840 
γ =0.010 
contractor 0.826 0.752 0.694 0.626 0.611 0.632 0.682 0.734 0.829 
client 0.831 0.759 0.705 0.659 0.648 0.677 0.716 0.755 0.842 
γ =0.020 
contractor 0.838 0.758 0.704 0.668 0.645 0.660 0.705 0.751 0.838 
client 0.845 0.793 0.746 0.709 0.701 0.705 0.735 0.804 0.854 
γ=0.050 
contractor 0.843 0.807 0.750 0.706 0.704 0.718 0.745 0.785 0.851 
client 0.948 0.910 0.880 0.852 0.836 0.860 0.883 0.912 0.954 
γ =0.100 
contractor 0.957 0.904 0.881 0.847 0.839 0.852 0.880 0.917 0.953 
 
 
Table 12. Direction of change of the objective function value with changing parameters 
  
profit margin 
(β) 
increases 
discount rate 
(γ) increases 
bargaining 
power weight 
w(A) increases 
bargaining 
power weight 
w(B) increases 
objective function 
value of the client 
(fA(x))   
    
objective function 
value of the 
contractor (fB(x))   
    
 
 
Table 13. Schedules for different benefit amounts 
 Activity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Finishing Time 0 14 15 24 20 20 20 24 25 25 30 30 30 30 
σ = 0 
Mode 3 3 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 
Finishing Time 0 10 5 10 15 14 19 20 20 24 24 24 24 24 
σ = 25 
Mode 3 3 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Finishing Time 0 5 10 19 15 15 19 20 20 20 24 24 24 24 
σ = 50 
Mode 3 1 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Finishing Time 0 3 6 14 11 10 15 16 16 16 20 20 20 20 
σ = 100 
Mode 3 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Finishing Time 0 3 6 5 11 10 15 16 16 16 20 20 20 20 
σ = 200 
Mode 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Finishing Time 0 3 6 15 11 10 15 16 16 16 19 20 20 20 
σ = 500 
Mode 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
